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CHAPTER 1 
I NTROOUCTI ON 
There is evidence supporting the hypothesis that the supply schedule 
of transfer services is upward sloping, at least in the short run. The 
price of these transfer services, commonly known as transfer costs or 
co11111ercialization margin, is usually a signifi cant proportion of the 
commodity price. Transfer costs establish a barrier to trade that is 
sometimes more important than that posed by taxes and tariffs. In 
relative terms, commerc ialization margins may be considerably more 
variable than co11111odity prices. 
Despite these facts, most commodity trade models generally adopt 
either explicitly or implicitly the simplifying assumption t hat the 
supply of transfer services is infinitely price respons ive. In general, 
these studies lack tests that justify the adoption of this assumption. 
Moreover, they do not discuss what the implications of this hypothesi s 
are for the empirical results obtained. 
The purpose of this research is to offer insight on how some of the 
results deriv ed from trade models under perfectly elastic supply of 
transfer services are modified when this assumption is relaxed. The 
topics specifically addressed are the price transmission elasticities and 
the derived commodity elasticities. The approach used in the study is 
essentia lly theoretical, but some examples extracted from world 
agricultural trade are also presented to illustrate the major 
concl11sions . 
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Definitions 
For the purpose of the present study, transfer costs are defined as 
the difference in commodity prices between two successive stages of the 
corrmercia lizati on channel with the exclusion of the taxes and/or 
subs idies applied to the commodity itself. 
According to the above definition, transfer costs are the payments 
made to the transfer services industry for its contribution to the 
corrmercialization process. This industry provides handling, storage , 
transportation, processing, and sa les. 
Statement of the Problem 
Transfer costs are an important and highly variable part of the 
price that consumers pay for agricultural commodities . These costs and 
their variability increase drastically when commodities are traded 
i nternati onally, since in this particular case they must include payments 
to international and foreign transfer services in addition to the 
domestic ones . Charts 1 and 2 illustrate how substantial can be the 
transfer costs involved in the trade of grains. For the periods covered 
by the charts, t he transfer costs between the farm and the importer' s 
port ranged from 32% to 55% of t he farm pri ce for wheat, wh i l e the 
analogous range for corn was 24% to 45%. It must be noted that the CIF 
prices are still lower than the domest ic price in the importer country 
(if t his country do es not subsidize consumption). 
A look at Tables 1 and 2 gives a notion of the variability of 
transfer costs compared to commodity ~r ices . They show that the 
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estimates of the standard deviation are higher for commodity prices than 
for transfer costs . However, a better measure to compare the relative 
variability of transfer costs and commodity prices is the coefficient of 
variation, defined as 
Coefficient of Variation = Standard Deviation Mean · lOO 
It can be seen that, with the exception of the transfer costs between 
Kansas and Gulf for wheat, all of the other transfer costs have higher 
coefficients of variation than the respective commodity prices. This is 
especially so for the transfer costs corresponding to international 
trade , whose coefficients of variation double those of wheat and corn 
prices. 
Studies by Finger and Yeats (1976), Sampson and Yeats (1977, 1978), 
and Yeats (1977), show that transportation costs (one component of 
transfer costs) may establish a barrier to international trade at least 
as important as tariffs. Despite this evidence, most international trade 
models have focused on the impact of tariffs on trade, wh i le little 
attention has been paid to the effect of transfer costs . 
George and King (1971) point out that poor knowledge about the 
behavior of the transfer services industry correspondi ng to a given 
commodity may severely restrict the understanding of the commodity market 
itself. Nevertheless, studies using derived corrrnodity demand and supply 
functions have consistently overlooked the transfer services industry . 
These models have implicitly or explicitly assumed that either the 
transfer costs were constant or they were a function of the commodity 
Chart 1. Selected Transfer Costs and Price Ratios 
for Wheat, 1977-1986 
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(b) 
Farm: U.S. farm price for Winter Wheat (Source : USDA). 
Kansas : Kansas City price for Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary protein 
(Source: USDA). 
Gulf: FOB Gulf price for Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary protein 
(Source : USDA). 
Japan: CIF Japan price for U.S . Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary 
protein (Source: International Wheat Cou ncil). 
Chart 2. Selected Transfer Costs and Price Ratios for 
Corn, 1977/78-1986/87 (October-September) 
(a) Selected Transfer Costs 
(b) Selected Price Ratios 
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Farm: U.S. farm price (Source: USDA). 
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Rotterdam: Asking price for CIF Rotterdam 30 day delivery U.S . No. 
3 Yellow Corn (Sourr:e: USDA). 
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Table 1. Estimated Statistics for Wheat Prices and Wheat Transfer Costs, 
1977-1986 
Standard Coefficient 
Mean Deviation of Variation 
(US$/M.Ton) (US$/M.Ton) (%) 
Farm 120.20 19.338 16.1 
Kansas 134. 00 22.435 16.7 
Prices Gulf 147. 60 24.213 16.4 
Japan 176.00 32. 010 18.2 
Kansas - Farm 13.80 3.938 28.5 
Transfer Gulf - Kansas 13.60 2.221 16.3 
Costs Japan - Gulf 28.40 11. 276 39.7 
Farm: U.S. farm price for Winter Wheat (Source: USDA). 
Kansas: Kansas City price for Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary protein 
(Source: USDA). 
Gulf: FOB Gulf price for Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary protein 
(Source: USDA) . 
Japan: CIF Japan price for U.S. Hard Winter Wheat, ordinary protein 
(Source: International Wheat Council). 
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Table 2. Estimated Statistics for Corn Prices and Corn Transfer Costs , 
1977/78-1986/87 (Oct .-Sept . ) 
Standard Coefficient 
Mean Deviation of Variation 
(US$/M. Ton) (US$/M. Ton) (%) 
Farm 96.80 19.606 20 . 3 
Prices Gulf 112. 40 21.125 18.8 
Rotterdam 128. 70 22. 381 17.4 
Transfer Gulf - Farm 15.60 4.169 26.7 
Costs Rotterdam - Gulf 16. 30 6.567 40.3 
Farm: U.S. farm price (Source: USDA). 
Gulf : FOB Gulf price for No. 3 Yellow Corn (Source: USDA) . 
Rotterdam: Asking price for CIF Rotterdam 30 day delivery U.S. No. 
3 Yellow Corn (Source: USDA). 
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price. These studies neither tested the validity of these simplifying 
assumptions nor presented their implications for the analysis of the 
results obtained . 
At a theoretica l l evel Gardner (1975) demonstrated that neither a 
fixed percentage of price nor a fixed abso lute spread between farm and 
retail prices are pricing rules consistent with a compet itive food 
industry. 
There are studies by Zannetos (1966), USDA (1968), Binkley and 
Revelt (1981) , Binkley (1983), Gallagher (1983), and Meilke and Moschini 
(1987) that give empirical support for the hypothesis that the supply of 
transfer services is upward sloping, at least in the short run. This 
evidence should not be neglected , because in some cases it may change 
dramatically the results and/or inferences attained from trade model s 
(for empirical examples of this see Gallagher, 1983, and Meilke and 
Moschini, 1987). 
With these precedents it would be of interest to further develop a 
theory of trade with a supply of transfer services that is not perfectly 
elastic. This should allow a better understanding of the limitat ions of 
the empirical results obtained under the standard assumption of an 
infinitely price-responsive supply of transfer servi ces. 
Goals of the Study 
The goal of the study is to rev ea l some of the implication s for 
trade models of relaxing the standard assumption about transfer services 
su pply, namely, that it is infinitely price responsive. The research 
11 
is mainly theoretical, and it deals specifically with price transmission 
elasticities and with derived commodity demand and supply elasticities. 
The manner in which transfer services in less than perfectly elastic 
supply affect the standard result that there is only one price 
transmission elasticity is examined . 
The findings of the price transmission elasticities study are then 
used to analyze derived corrmodity demand and supply elasticities. In 
this case the objective is to assess how the commodity elasticity 
estimates obtained from standard trade models compare to "true" commodity 
elasticities . 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies by Finger and Yeats (1976) , Sampson and Yeats (1977 , 1978 ) , 
and Yeats (1977) point out that transport costs are at l east as important 
as tariffs in res tricting international trade. 
Zannetos (1966) found that the short-run supply of tan kers was very 
inelastic at volumes close to industry capacity. He estimated that at 
95% of industry capacity, the elasticity of supply was 0. 02 . 
A report of the USDA (1968) asserts that "although distance is a 
factor in determining rates, the major determinant appears to be the 
short-run relationships between the supply of shipping available for 
grain cargoes and the demand for such shipping. 11 
A paper by Binkley and Revelt (1981) support s the hypothesis that 
the supply of ocean transportation services i s very elastic at low 
volumes of trade and quite inelastic when it is close to full capacity. 
One of its main co nclus ions is that assuming that transport costs do not 
affect trade models may lead to incorrect results. Also, it suggests 
i ncreased efforts to endogenize transportati on costs in non -spatial trade 
models. 
Accord i ng to Binkley (1983) , the supply of marketing services is 
inelastic in the short-run, mainly due to hi gh investment costs i n this 
industry. He examined monthly dat a for U. S. Gulf and Rot terdam pri ces of 
wheat, corn , and soybeans and concluded that freight rates (measured by a 
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world index comprising all dry bulk commodities) were a major cause of 
the fluctuations in the price spread between both locations . 
Gallagher (1983) found evidence that the international transfer 
costs affected the U.S.-Japan lumber trade, and also that the 
international marketing services, mainly transportation, were in 
ine lastic supply . According to his results, the price transmissi on 
elasticity between both countries was much higher than in the presence of 
constant international transfer costs . 
Meilke and Moschini (1987) studied the quarterly spatial pri ce 
differentials between the U.S. and Canadian livestock industries. They 
found that quantity traded was a very important explanatory variable f or 
the price spreads analyzed, supporting the hypothesis that transfer 
services are in inelastic supply. It is worth mentioning t hat 
transportation costs taken in isolation had little significance in t he 
price linkage relations and even less when the volume of trade was 
simultaneously included in these equations. 
By means of a three-sector model Gardner (1975) showed that fi xed-
percentage and/or fixed-abso l ute-transfer-cost rules between the farm and 
retail levels are incompatible with perfect competition. He also 
demonstrated that in general there is not a unique price transmission 
elasticity between the farm and retail levels. His model i s specifi cally 
designed for the case in which commodity and transfer costs are 
substitutes for each other, since it breaks down when this kind of 
substitution is not al lowed. 
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Tweeten (1967) measured the elasticity of foreign demand for U. S. 
farm output. He considered aggregate supply and demand elasticities for 
farm products in foreign countries and assumed all price transmission 
elasticities equal to one. 
Another measure of the elasticity of U.S . foreign demand for farm 
products was obtained by Johnson (1977), who first calculated the 
elasticities of foreign demand for individual commodities, and then 
aggregated them. He also assumed that the price transmission 
elasticities equaled one. 
Bredahl, Meyers, and Collins (1979) recognized the fact that the 
insulating policies of several countries involved in the international 
trade of grains made it hard to sustain the assumption that the price 
transmission elasticities for them were one. Working with the hypothesis 
of a zero price transmission elasticity for these countries, they showed 
that the elasticities of U.S. foreign demand were substantially lower 
than those obtained by Johnson and Tweeten. 
In a review of 45 studies on major U.S. agricultural commodities, 
Gardiner and Dixit (1986) found that their estimates of the elasticities 
of foreign demand for each corrmodity lay in a very wide range. In none 
of those studies were transfer costs endogenized. 
Using a logarithmic model , Collins (1980) calculated the price 
transmission elasticities between the U.S. and numerous countries for 
wheat, corn, and soybeans. It was assumed that the transfer costs 
between the U.S . Gulf ports and the countries ' internal markets were 
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constant percentages of the U. S. Gulf price. The calculated values for 
the price transmission elasticities were between almost zero and one . 
Meyers, He lmar, and Devadoss (1986a, 1986b) and Bahrenian, Devadoss , 
and Meyers (1986) obtained pri ce transmission elasticities between prices 
in the U. S. and in several of the major countries involved in the wor ld 
grain trade. They used linear equations to link the prices, and they 
assumed that transfer costs were a linear function of prices. 
In most of t he reviewed studies there was an implicit assumption of 
transfer costs behavior, but no explicit recognition or treatment of this 
issue . The large size and variability of transfer costs during past 
years ( refer to Charts 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and 2) is evidence that the 
transfer services industry needs to be treated more explicitly in trade 
studies than it has been in the past. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUAL PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL 
Adapting the analysis of marketing margins made by George and King 
(1971) to the present context, some interesting assumptions regarding 
price relationships underlying most partial equilibrium trade models can 
be easily discovered. It is important to note that these assumptions are 
implicit and not always recognized by the users of those models . 
From now on 11 sel ler 11 and 11 buyer 11 wi 11 mean any two groups of 
economic agents interacting through the mar ket. The seller supplies a 
specific cornmodity, while the buyer demands this same commodity or a 
processed product requiring a fixed proportion of this commodity . It 
must be clearly understood that the 11 seller-buyer 11 linkage is 
representing here any relationship between successive sellers and buyers 
through the cornmercialization channel; it may be describing linkages such 
as "exporter- importer, 11 11 f armer-retail er, 11 "who 1 esa l er-processor, 11 
"wholesaler-exporter," and so on. 
Variables may be defined as follows 
Q = amount of commodity 
AQ = amount of commodity supplied by the seller 
BQ = amount of commodity (or fixed - proportion processed product 
in commodity units) demanded by the buyer 
p = price per unit of cornmodity 
AP = price received by the seller 
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BP = price paid by the buyer 
expected buyer ' s price given the information avail -
able at the time the purchase from the sel ler is made 
expected transfer costs between buyer and 
seller level s at the time of purchase 
Ao, Bo = other variables affecting the behavioral relationships 
at the buyer and seller levels 
Using the definit ions above, some behavi oral relationships regarding 
commodity demand and supply can be formulated implicitly in a very 
general way. 
(buyer demand) B(BQ, BP, BO) = O (1) 
(supply of transfer services) TS(BQ, 8P, M) = O (2) 
(demand for transfer services) TD(AQ, AP, M) = O ( 3) 
(seller supply) A(AQ, AP, AO) = O (4) 
Si nee M = E [ 8P I I A J -AP, the supply of and demand for transfer 
services (expressions 2 and 3) can be stated also as 
(5) 
(6) 
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Under certain assumptions these implicit functions can be simplified 
substantially . This becomes very important for research, espPcially that 
related to empirical applications. In this paper the most important ones 
are 
1. Perfect competition 
To assume 60 = AQ means that it is not possible to substitute 
transfer services for conmodity, which may be realistic for many 
commodities. But it also means that the market is always in equilibrium, 
which is a strong assumption. This is especially so when very short 
periods of time are involved because of the possibil ity of market 
disequilibrium (see Kinnucan and Forker , 1987). 
To consider E [ 6P I 1AJ = 6P is not always innocuous, as noted by 
George and Ki ng (1971) . It may prove to be important according to trade 
modalities, and it is hard to justify it when there is a long interval 
between the effective purchase to the seller and the effective sale to 
the buyer. 
In explicit form a very simple special case of expressions (1) and 
(4) can be stated as 
(buyer demand) (7) 
(seller suppl y) A A Q = y + 6 P; 6 > 0 (8) 
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To obtain the derived demand at the seller level (B0d) the buyer 
price must be expressed in terms of the seller price: 
(derived seller demand) = a - (9) 
Finally, in equilibrium, Bod =BO= AO (10) 
Equations (7) through (10) form a system that allows one to solve 
for the values of Bod, AO, Bq, AP, and BP in equilibrium. This is so 
if M is either an exogenous constant or an endogenous variable. In this 
latter case one more equation should be added to the system above, 
specifying the functional form of M. 
It is important to point out here that the equilibrium amount of 
commodity in this system, Bod = 60 =AO, represents simultaneously the 
equilibrium quantity of transfer services expressed in units of 
commodity. This is so because it is assumed that the commodity is always 
combined with a fixed proportion of transfer services, that is, 
substitution of transfer services for commodity is not allowed in this 
system. Therefore, the quantity of transfer services will be expressed 
by T or O interchangeably from now on. 
At the same time, relations (7) and (8) also provide the demand for 
transfer services. Rearranging them: 
(11) 
(12) 
20 
By def i nit ion , in equi li bri um, M = MS = MO (13) 
where MO = ~p - AP. 
By the equil ibrium condition, BQ = AQ = To= Ts. (14) 
Now, substitu ting (ll), (12), and (14) into (13) and solving for 
To = (CLO + By) - (~) Mo 
s + o s+c; 
(15) 
This is the demand schedu le for transfer services , whi ch is 
negatively sloped: 
On the other hand, the supp ly schedule of transfer services adopts a 
very simpl e form in most non- spat ial partial equilibrium models (N- SPEM) 
and spatial partial equilibrium models (SPEM) as well. 
In the case of N-SPEM most attention is devoted to the estimation of 
the wholesa le demand and fa rm supply fun ctions for the commodity , wh ile 
the supply schedule of transfer servi ces is overlooked. In N- SPEM the 
price linkage equations are general ly formulated as 
(16) 
where u = random disturbance, and 6, cf> = constants. 
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To adopt this kind of linkage equation is to implicitly postulate a 
supp ly of transfer services of the form 
(17) 
Thi s is so because to attain equilibrium in the transfer services market, 
MS = MD must hold. Then, from expressions (13) and (17), 
Now, solving this expression for Bp yields (16 ) . 
In SPEM the supply of transfer services adopts a more elementary 
form, since most of these models postulate constant transfer costs: 
(18) 
where p =positive constant. 
To provide a better understanding of what has been said thus far, 
the same ana lysis is made now with graphical tools . Fi gure 1 dep icts the 
seller supply of and buyer demand for the commodity . The intersection of 
N 
these two curves would provide a market equilibrium at Q and P if 
transfer costs were zero. As long as transfer costs are positive, the 
N 
equilibrium amount of colTITiodity is sma ller than Q, the equi librium seller 
price is lower than P, and the equilibrium buyer pri ce is higher than P, 
the difference between them being the equil ibrium transfer cost. One 
* A * B * * B * A * such equilibrium is provided by Q , P , P , and M = P - P • 
Moreover, if transfer costs exceed M = 8P - Ap, the equilibri um 
quantity of colTYllodity is zero . 
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Figure 1. Commodity Supply and Demand 
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Figure 2. Demand for Transfer Services 
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The information provided by Figure 1 is put another way in Figure 2. 
The difference between both figures is that the second one has the 
difference between the buyer and seller prices on the vertical axis . The 
schedule shown in Figure 2 is the vertical difference between the buyer 
demand and the sel l er supply. This curve is actually a demand func-
tion for transfer services: as long as M =BP - AP is smaller than 
Bp - Ap, there is a positive quantity of transfer services demanded, 
and this increases as M = BP - AP decreases. 
It also follows that if o* is an equilibrium quantity of 
corrrnodity, it must also be an equilibrium level of transfer services. 
This means that the supply schedule of transfer services passes through 
the point with coordinates (Q*, M*) . If this supply function i s as 
stated in equation (17) , its shape is as shown in Figure 3, which 
reproduces Figure 2 with the addition of the supply of transfer services . 
For empirical modeling the supply of transfer services is generally 
restricted to adopt the form of equation (17) in N-SPEM, through price 
linkages like (16), or equation (18) in SPEM. The best reason for this is 
that it simplifies matters drastically, as it wi 11 be shown in the next 
chapter . But it is surprising that trade models generally present no 
tests along with the results to validate the hypothesized supply of 
transfer services. 
If expression (17) i s analyzed in more detail, it will soon become 
apparent that it is a very restrictive f ormulation for a supply of 
transfer services . First , it assumes a perfectly elastic supply of 
transfer servi ces (actua l ly, there would be a one-to-one relationship 
24 
M 
"' M=O L--~~~~~----'~*~~~-~.>..--~~~~~~~-
Q Q Q 
Figure 3. Supply of and Demand for Transfer Serv ices 
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Figure 4. Supply of Transfer Services of Standard N-SPEM 
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Figure 5. Supply of Transfer Services of Standard SPEM. 
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Figure 6. Supply Functions of Transfer Services Supported by Empirical 
Evidence 
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between Ap and Q if the changes i n prices were due only to shifts in the 
demand schedule for the commodity ) . Second, it does not take into account 
the fi xed capacity of the indu stry of transfer services . Represented 
graphically, equation (17) is of t he form shown in Figure 4. 
On the other hand, the supp ly of transfer services used in SP EM, 
that is, equation (18 ) , is mo re restrictive still. Transfer costs are 
constant as depicted in Figure 5. 
The works by Binkley and Revelt (1981), Binkley (1983) , and 
Gallagher (1983) support the hypothesis of a suppl y of transfer services 
positively related to the amount of commodity traded. The shapes of the 
functions found by them are shown in Figures 6a (B in kl ey and Revelt, 
1981; Binkley, 1983) and 6b and 6c (Gal lagher, 1983). 
If there is a positive relationship between MS and Q as shown in 
those studies , t he price transmission elasticities and the derived supp ly 
and demand elasticities for the commodity must be adjusted. This is so 
because their values will in general be different from those calculat ed 
under the assumption of a perfect ly el as ti c supply of transfer services . 
The analysis of these points , which const itu t es the principal purpose of 
this thesis, i s made in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
Price Transmission Elasticities 
The price transmission elasticity found in the li terature (Horner, 
1952; Cronin, 1979; Tweeten, 1967; Johnson, 1977; Bredahl et al., 1979; 
Collins, 1980; George and King, 1971, among others) is defined by the 
expression 
(19) 
where nAB = price transmission elasticity between the seller and buyer 
levels. 
The price transmission elasticity is used as a device to estimate 
derived corrmodity demand and/or supply elasticities. For instance, 
suppose that the elasticity of supply at the seller level (S) is known, 
and one wants to attain the value of the elasticity of supply at the 
buyer level, that is, the derived elasticity of supply (BS). Then 
since 
Some studies state that in order to obtain a simple expression for 
the price transmission elasticity it is neces>ary to adopt a simple 
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structure of the supply of transfer services (namely, expressions 17 or 
18). But, with the exception of Gardner (1975), it is not made clear 
that if the supply of transfer services is not perfectly elastic, it is 
not possibl e to have only one pri ce transmission elasticity relating two 
successive stages in the corrmercialization channel . Gardner uses a model 
different from the present one in that it collapses when substitution of 
commodity for transfer services is not allowed. He concludes that under 
A 
perfect competition the relative change in the price ratio (~) caused 
p 
by a commodity supply shock is different from the relative change due 
to a corrmodity demand shock. 
As shown below, when the supply of transfer services is of the form 
MS = MS(Q); 
a MS 
aq > 0 (21) 
one must define one price transmission elasticity for a commodity demand 
shock and another for a commodity supply shock.1 The expressions for 
the redefined price transmission elasticities are 
(22) 
(23) 
1Th1' s aMS result is true whenever aq- j 0, but it is as sumed 
aM5 throughout this paper that aq- > 0. 
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where n~B = price transmission elasticity for supply and n~A = price 
transmission elasticity for demand. 
The somewhat arbitrary names chosen to label the price transmission 
elasticities just defined are due to the fact that these elasticities are 
mainly used to calculate derived commodity elasticities of demand and/or 
supply as shown in expression (20). Expression (20) now becomes 
B S S = S nAB (24) 
If the elasticity of demand at the buyer level (D) is known, and it 
is necessary to estimate the elasticity of demand at the seller level or 
derived elasticity of demand (AD), the estimation can be done in a 
simi 1 ar way: 
(25) 
where 
Returning to definitions (22) and (23), it will now be shown how the 
expressions for ( : ::)S and (:!:)D are derived. To achieve this, 
graphical tools wi 11 be used. Figure 7 depi cts the necessary elements 
to illustrate the estimation of an expression for (~::)5 . 
The assumptions underlying Figure 7 are 
30 
(26) 
B>O (27) 
and linear commodity demand and supp ly. The li nearities in commodity 
demand and supp ly and in the supply of transfer services are not required 
to demonstrate the results but facilitate the understanding of the 
problem. 
Suppose that the initial equ i librium in the commodity market is at 
point (0) , where the buyer demand (B
0
) intersects the derived supply 
(BA) . The derived supply is obtained by adding the supply of transfer 
services to the seller supp ly (A) . With the given derived supply 
schedule a posi tive shock in demand causes the demand to shift from B0 
t o B1 with a new equilibrium at point (1). The increase in demand , 
t herefore , produces the following changes: 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
= TI-~=21 (31) 
Using ex pressions (28) and (29) 
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(32) 
The result stated by expression (32) can alternatively be derived using 
expressions (26) and (27): 
6BP = t;,.AP + t::.M 
= 6AP + S 6 Q 
Dividing through equation (33) by ( t::.AP): 
Therefore, 
(~Ap)S 
6BP 
=l+ s JO 
~ 
= 1 + 
3'2 + 21 =---
3'2 
= .2L 
32 
= 32 < 1 
TI 
(33) 
(34) 
(32) 
32 
p 
Q 
Figure 7. Market Equilibrium with a Commodity Demand Shock 
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This means that for infinitesimal changes, equation (34 ) becomes 
(35 ) 
To ( aAP)s estimate aBp , calculate (aBP)5 the reciprocal of aAP ; that is, 
(p)5 1 < 1 = CAp)S (36) = 
aBp A a8P 8=0 1 + 6~ 
a AP 
The inequality stated in (36) holds because 8>0, and supply is "normal" 
A 
in the sense that .£.Jl > 0. 
a AP 
Multiplying both sides of (36) by the ratio(!~): 
(37) 
Therefore, when the supply of transfer services i s less than 
perfectly elastic, the price transmission elasticity for supply is 
smaller than the price transmission elasticity generally used; that is, 
than the one estimated assuming an infinitely price-responsive supply of 
transfer serv ices . 
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On the other hand, the expression for ( aBP\ D can be worked out in a 
a AP) 
similar manner by making use of Figure 8. 
The assumptions underlying Figure 8 are the same as for Figure 7. 
Suppose that the initial equilibrium occurs at point (0) , where the 
derived demand AB crosses the seller supply schedule A0 . If there is 
a positive supply shock the seller supply shifts from A0 to A1, and 
the new equilibrium is point (1). The changes caused by this increase in 
supply are 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
6M (BP A (BP AP ) - (BP BP ) (AP AP ) = p 1) -1 0 0 - 1 0 1 0 
- - ~ - (- ~l) = TI-~ = ~ (41) 
From (38) and (39): 
(~ s90 = c-:r.> l ~ 1 (42) 
6AP (-!I) 
= -< 
TI 
A more general solution can be derived from expressions (26) and (27) 
as fo 11 ows: 
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Dividing through equation (43) by (68P): 
(
6AP\D = 1 - S 6BQ 
6BP"j 68P 
= 1 - s 
=l+ S _JQ_ 
~ 
= 1 + 2I 
32 
~ + 2I =---
TI 
( 43) 
(44) 
And the inverse of expression (44) is equation (42). Therefore, for 
infinitesimal changes, a general expression for (:~:)D is 
(45) 
1 - S=O 
36 
p 
\ 
~B 
Figure 8. Market Equ i librium with a Commodity Supply Shock 
Q 
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Again, the inequality stated in (45) holds because 8 > 0, and the 
aBQ 
buyer demand is 11 no '."rria 111 ; that is, -B- < 0. 
a P 
Now, multiplying both sides of the inequality (45 ) by(::)= 
(46 ) 
This means that the price transmission elasticity for demand is smaller 
when the supply of transfer services is not perfectly elastic. 
In summary, the price transmission elasticity for supply (n~B) is the 
relative change in seller and buyer prices when the system is affected 
by a demand shock. Conversely, the price transmission elasticity for 
demand (n~A) is the relative change in prices caused by a supply shock. 
The inequalities (37) and (46) can be used to derive the following 
general relationships among the different kinds of price transmission 
elasticities: 
(47) 
Since the price transmission elasticities for demand and supply are 
different when the supply of transfer services is not perfectly elastic 
(8#0), it follows that in this case the relationship between seller and 
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buyer prices is sensitive to the source of change in the quantity of 
commodity traded. In fact, it is more sensitive the more inelastic the 
supply of transfer services. 
Derived Supply and Demand Elasticities 
The results just derived concerning price transmission elasticities 
can be readily applied to the analysis of derived supply and demand 
elasticities. 
Take for instance the derived elasticity of supply at the buyer 
level (BS). Using equation (24), which is reproduced below for 
convenience, it is straightforward to derive the inequality (48) applying 
the results from inequality (37): 
(24) 
s s I nAB < s nAB 8=0 (48) 
The inequality above says that the derived buyer elasticity of supply 
assuming perfectly el as tic supply of transfer services (BS I 8=0) provides 
an upper limit estimate of the "true" buyer el asticity of supply. 
Similarly, if the direct elasticity of demand (D) is known, and it 
is desired to calculate the derived elasticity of demand at the seller 
level (AD), this can be done using equation (25): 
(25) 
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From the inequality (46), it follows that 
Ao = o n~A < o n~A l f3=0 = Ao I f3=0 (49) 
In words, expression (49) states that the derived seller elasticity of 
demand assuming perfectly elastic supply of transfer services (AO I f3=0) 
gives an upper limit estimate of the "true" seller elasticity of demand. 
Although fairly obvious, the two conclusions just mentioned contain 
important implications for assessing the bias of empirical estimates of 
derived elasticities calculated assuming transfer services in perfectly 
elastic supply. Nevertheless, the framework employed so far is very 
restrictive, and at this point some interesting questions arise. For 
instance: 
- Do these proposit ions hold when there i s more than 
one aggregate commodity supply and/or demand? 
- Can they be derived from more general frameworks? 
- What happens if the supply of transfer services is 
non-linear? 
Answers to the above question s are given in the remainder of this 
section, which is devoted only to the analysis of derived commodity 
demand elasticities. A similar development can be made to explore 
derived commodity supply elasticities, with completely analogous results. 
The explicit treatment of the transfer services industries greatly 
increases the complexity of trade models, as it will soon become 
apparent. This is why two model s are used here instead of a single 
general 1nalytical model including several aggregate commodity demand and 
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supply schedules . Model 1 consists of one aggregate commodity supply and 
two aggregate demands, and it is specially designed to uncover the effect 
of the characteristics of the transfer services industries serving the 
trade flows originating in each seller. Model 2 is composed of one 
aggregate commodity demand and two aggregate supplies, and it shows the 
consequences of the nature of the transfer services industries attending 
the trade flows arriving at each buyer. 
Model 1 
A simple model to study the derived commodity demand elasticity 
consists of two buyers ("B" and "b") that buy a homogeneous commodity 
from one seller ("A"), that does not discriminate between buyers. The 
scheme is depicted by Figure 9, in which the arrows indicate commodity 
flows: 
Trade "B" Trade "b" 
Demand 
Figure 9. Commodity Flows in a Trade System with Two Aggregate 
Demands and One Aggregate Supply 
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This can be thought of as two importing countries buying grains from 
an importer, in which case the demands are excess demands, and the supply 
is an excess supply. 
The set of equations representing this model is as fol lows: 
(Seller Supply "A") ( 50) 
BQ = BQ (BP); BQ 
B 
(Buyer Demand "B") = ~ < 0 (51) B aBp 
bQ bQ (bP); bQ 
b 
(Buyer Demand "b") = = ~ < 0 (52) b abp 
(Price linkage equation "B") BP = AP + BM (53) 
(Price linkage equation "b") bp = AP + bM (54) 
(Trade "B") BT = BQ (55) 
(Trade "b") bT = bQ (56) 
(Supply of transfer services for trade 11 811 ) 
BM= BM(BT, bT); 
BM 
B B =~~BM = l..!:! ~ 0 ( 57) B a BT b abT 
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(Supply of transfer services for trade 11 b") 
(58) 
(Equilibrium) (59) 
The symbols correspond t o 
AP 
' 
AQ =quantity of commodity supplied by seller "A" 
BQ, bq =quantity of commodity demanded by buyers "B" and "b", 
respectively 
BT, bT = amount of commodity traded in trades 11 B11 and "b II> 
respectively 
BP 
' 
bp = price received by se ll er "A"' and paid by buyers "B" 
and "b"' respectively 
BM, bM = transfer costs for trades 11 B11 and 11 b11 , respectively 
Equations (57) and (58) deserve more comment . They are intended to 
be the most general formulation of the supply of transfer services 
applicable to this system. Examples of particular situations follow. 
1. One transfer services industry serving both trades, its supply is 
less than perfectly elastic: 
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2. There is one transfer services industry specialized in each trade, 
but they are related; their supplies are less than perfectly 
elastic: 
3. There is one transfer services industry specialized in each trade, 
and they are completely unrelated; their supplies are less than 
perfectly elastic: 
4. The standard assumption made in most N-SPEM and SPEM is that both 
transfer services industries have a perfectly elastic supply: 
These different specifications for the supply of transfer services 
will lead to particular solutions of the model with different 
implications, as will be seen after the system is solved for a general 
solution. 
The first step is to find the formula for the derived commodity 
demand elasticity that seller 11 A11 faces (AD). This will allow us to 
explore analytically the consequences for Ao of different assumptions 
regarding the transfer services industries . 
(60) 
where AQD = 8Q + b(i =aggregate demand that seller 11 A11 faces . 
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A 0 aAQD 
From the definition for Q the value of -A~ is obtained as 
a P 
(61) 
The expressions for (:!:)O and (:!:)O can be derived si multaneously 
from equati ons (53), (54), (57), and (58) . 
( 62) 
(63) 
Expressions (62) an (63) can be solved for (:!:)O and ( : ::)
0
: 
(64) 
(65) 
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Substituting (65) and (64) into (61) yields 
(66) 
Finally , rep lacing express ion (66) in (60), and after rearrangement, the 
solution for the derived commodity demand elasticity is obtained : 
(67) 
A Dgf+dr(l - f)+[TBBr(l - g)( l-f)+Tbbg(l-r)f -TBbr(l - g)f-TbBg(l - r)(l - f)JOd 
D = ------.l.--+_T_B_B=o...,...,(1.-_-g ....... )- +- T-bb- d,.....,(,.....l- r.....,)_+_(,_T_B_B T_b_b ___ TB_b_T_b_B )~D~d-.-(1~--g._,..)...,..(1.---r~)--
where 
T·. 
lJ 
B f=..Ji~1 A " Q 
i=B,b; j=B, b 
46 
and the restrictions 
Here D and d are the direct elasticities of demand of buyers 11 B11 and 11 b11 , 
respectively. The inverse of the own elasticity of supply of transfer 
services 11 i 11 is T . . , and T .. is the i nverse of the cross elasticity 
11 , J 
of supply of transfer services 11 j 11 with respect to transfer costs 11 i 11 • 
The proportion of total consumption demanded by buyer 11 B''is f, while g 
and rare the seller price relative to the buyer prices . 
Expressions (66) and (67) are the basis for the analysis that 
follows, which consists of several cases regarding different as sumptions 
about the transfer services industry. These exercises are attempted to 
help assess the bias of the derived demand elasticities estimated by 
means of SPEM and N-SPEM that assume perfectly elastic supply of t ran sfer 
services. 
Case 1: Expression (25) is just a special case of (66 ) and (67 ) ; it 
corresponds to the situation where buyer 11 b11 does not demand commodity. 
Therefore, setting bQ=O, (66) becomes 
(68 ) 
Or, in elasticities 
= Dg 
l + TBB 00-g) (69) 
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If the supply of transfer services is perfectly elastic, T88 =0, and (69) 
becomes 
(70) 
Comparing (69) and (70) it is clear that 
(71) 
There are two noteworthy observations concerning the relation between the 
two derived elasticities. First, the difference between them increases 
as the supply of transfer services becomes more inelastic, since 
Second, the gap between the derived elasticities is bigger the more 
elastic the (direct) buyer demand (0): 
g - > 0 
[l + TBB 0(1-g)J2 
(73) 
A graphical representation of the mentioned facts for the simplest 
example (1 seller and 1 buyer) is given below. 
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In Figure 10 the direct buyer demand is represented by AA '. The 
lines BB' , CC 1 , and AD 1 are the derived demands at the se 11 er l eve 1; BB 1 
i s drawn assuming TBB=O, while for re-• and A[)• it is postulated that 
TBB > 0. Moreover, for AD ' the supply of transfer services is more 
- D C inelastic than for CC'(TBB>TBB). The derived elasticities of demand 
for the three curves can be measured by 
Then: AD 
AD 
Therefore: 
(o A - D 
TsB=o 
"""';it'""" I 
= .Q__g__ 
LBB=o 
TBB=o 
-; 
OQ 
- AD 
- AD 
J-to T~B 
c 
LBB 
= 
D 
TBB 
= 
TBB=o 
-*- * CT'S I Q BI - Q c· ---
---; ---; 
OQ OQ 
-*--*-
Q B'-Q 0 1 O""'lfT ---
---; -; 
OQ OQ 
"~B) = ----AD D1 B1 -C 1 B1 ---; OQ 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
o·c· = -- > 0 (79) 
---; 
OQ 
p 
A 
c 
B P--
B 
A P--
* 0 Q 
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\\~ \ \ 
D' C' B' A' 
Figure 10. Direct and Derived Commodity Demands Under Different Supply 
Schedules of Transfer Services 
Q 
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The size of the bias in the estimated derived elasticity of demand due to 
not considering that transfer services are in less than perfectly elastic 
supply is bigger the more inelastic the supply of transfer services. 
In Figure 11, AA' and CC' are buyer demands with AB and CE as their 
corresponding derived demands at the seller level, assuming T88 > 0. 
The picture is drawn such that the elasticity of supply of transfer 
services is the same for both derived demands. The direct elasticity 
of demand for AA I is sma 11 er than for rr· (DA < De)' si nee 
-*- -*-
-QA' Q e• _ DA - De - -- - -- -
-;: -;: 
OQ OQ 
- ~ <O (80) 
--; 
OQ 
The respective differences between derived elasticities with and without 
perfectly elastic supply of transfer services are 
* = Q A' II 
~ 
OQ 
* ~ =oe· .. _~=~ 
~ ---; ---; 
OQ OQ OQ 
The comparison between these differences yields 
( A ) (A A ~ E"C""'° BA"' De =O - De - DA =O - DA = ::=:-- - ===-- > 0 '(BB TBB * * 
OQ OQ 
(81) 
(82) 
(83) 
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p 
A 
0 B A111 A' E C'" c I Q 
Figure 11. Different Direct and Derived Commodity Demands Under the Same 
Supply Schedules of Transfer Services 
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In words, expression (80) together with (83) says that the bias of the 
estimated derived elasticity of demand that results from assuming a 
perfectly elastic supply of transfer services becomes bigger the more 
elastic is the direct buyer demand. 
These two observations are very important and intimately related to 
each other for empirical research. Their relevance has to do with the 
period of adjustment of the supply of transfer services and the demand 
for corrrnodity. 
There is some evidence (Bink ley and Revelt, 1981; Binkley , 1983 ) 
that the longer the time period, the more elastic is the supply of 
transfer services . Taking this alone into consideration , one can 
conclude that in order to increase the ac curacy of the estimate of the 
derived demand, it is rrore important to specify a price-responsive supp ly 
of transfer 
that ~o 
services in the short run. This is so because 
b ) would become bigger. 
Q=O 
it is then 
On the other hand, it constitutes a stylized fact that, at least 
within certain li mits , corrrnodity demands are more inelastic the shorter 
the run.l From this knowledge only one can infer that the support for 
considering explicit ly a less than perfectly elastic supply of trans-
fer services is weaker the shorter the run, since(AD _AD ~ 
bQ=T =0 bQ=O 
BB 
would be sma ller in the short run. 
1For a detailed study of this see Pasour and Schrimper (1965). 
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It follows from the two paragraphs above that it is not possible to 
make a general recommendation as for which length of run it is more 
important to specify carefully the supply of transfer services in the 
one- seller/one-buyer case. It would be of interest to conduct empirical 
research to shed more light on this point. 
Case 2: The standard simplification made in SPEM and N-SPEM 
consists of making the supply schedules of transfer services infinitely 
price responsive, that is, 
= 0 (84) 
or alternat i vely TBB = TBb = Tbb = TbB = T = 0 (85) 
Therefore, expressions (66) and (67) collapse to 
(86) 
AD I T =O = D gf + d r (1-f) (87) 
This particular case is of crucial importance, because it represents most 
of the empirical estimates of derived demand elasticities found in the 
literature . 
From the comparison with the unrestricted situation of equation 
(67), it follows thatl 
1The proof of this result is in Appendix 1. 
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(88) 
This means that for this kind of model the standard derived demand 
elasticity overestimates the 11 t rue 11 derived elasticity of demand. 
Case 3: If both trades 11 811 and 11 b11 are attended by the same 
transfer services industry, and this has a supply schedule that is not 
infinitely price responsive, the restrictions upon the model are 
(89) 
And the expressions (66) and (67) become 
(90) 
= Ogf + dr(l-f) 
1 + TBBD(l-g) + Tbbd(l - r) ( 91) 
This derived commodity demand elasticity may be either bigger or smaller 
than the unrestricted one , but it is unambiguously smaller than 
Ao I T=O ' Therefore, if the actual situation is such that there is only 
one transfer services industry serving both trades , the standard derived 
commodity demand elasticity (AD I T=O) is biased upward. 
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Case 4: When there is no linkage at all between the transfer 
services industries attending trades 11 811 and "b", and their supplies are 
not perfectly elastic, the restri ctions on equations (57) and (58) are 
and (92) 
or alternatively 
and ( 93 ) 
In this case expressions (66) and (67) are reduced to 
(94) 
Dgf + dr (l-f) + [TBBr(l-g)(l-f) + Tbbg(l-r)f]Dd 
= ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1 + TBBD(l-g) + Tbbd(l-r) + TBBTbbod(l-g)(l-r) (95 ) 
The comparison with the unrestricted situation and Cases 2 and 3 yields 1 
(96 ) 
(97) 
(98) 
1The proof of these results is in Appendix 1. 
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This set of results is very important, particularly the inequalities 
(96) and (97) : transfer services industries unrelated to each other and 
with upward-sloping supply schedules lead to a derived commodity demand 
elasticity smaller than the standard estimate (Ao <Ao j ... =0'\. LBb =TbB=O • 1; 
Moreover, if the transfer services industries are related to each 
other, the derived commodity demand becomes even more inelastic 
(
AD <AD ) The intuition behind these concepts is given by 
LBb=TbB=O • 
means of Figures 12, 13, and 14 in which sets (a) and (b) depict the 
individual direct and derived commodity demand curves of buyers 11 B11 and 
11 b11 , respectively, and set (c) shows the aggregate direct and derived 
commodity demand curves that seller 11 A11 faces. 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 are exactly the same with the exception of 
their derived commodity demands. In Figure 12 it is assumed that 
transfer services are in perfectly elastic supply; in Figure 13 it is 
hypothesized that there are two transfer services industries completely 
unrelated to each other and with upward-sloping supply schedules; and in 
Figure 14 it is assumed that there is only one transfer services industry 
and it has a less than infinitely price-responsive supply. It can be 
seen that at (Q*, p*) the derived demand of Figure 12c is more 
elastic than the derived demands of either Figure 13c or 14c ; that is, 
the derived commodity demand is more inelastic when the transfer services 
industries have upward-sloping supply than when they have infinitely 
price-responsive supply . On the other hand, the derived commodity demand 
of Figure 13c is more elastic than that of Figure 14c. This means that 
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the derived commodity demand elasticity is smaller when the transfer 
services industries are related to each other than when they are 
completely independent. 
The synthesis of the main results obtained with Model 1 is presented 
in Table 3, which contains the analytical relationships among the derived 
commodity demand elasticities under different restrictions regarding the 
supply of transfer services. 
The bottom line of these observations is that, as long as the 
transfer services industries have less than perfectly elastic supply 
schedules, the standard estimate of the derived commodity demand 
elasticity is biased upward, since Ao I T=O >Ao. The existence of 
interdependence among the transfer services industries attending the 
trade flows emanating from each seller makes the derived commodity 
demand more inelastic, as Ao >Ao. However, since 
TBb="(bB=O 
Ao <> Ao 
8 8 b b , it does not necessarily follow that the 
MB= Mb; Mb= MB 
derived commodity demand elasticity is smallest when the trade flows 
originating in each seller are attended by a single industry . 
Model 2 
This consists of two sellers ("A" and "a") supplying a certain 
commodity to a buyer ( 11 811 ). The commodity is homogeneous, and the buyer 
is completely indifferent to the origin of the commodity . The schematic 
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representation of the model is given in Figure 15, with the arrows 
indicating commodity flows. 
Buyer "B" 
Trade "A" Trade 11 a" 
Figure 15. Commodity Flows in a Trade System wi th Two Aggregate 
Supplies and One Aggregate Demand 
The mathematical representation of this model is as follows; 
(Sel ler Supply "A" ) (99 ) 
(Sel ler Supply 11 a11 ) (100) 
(Buyer Demand) (101) 
(Price linkage equation "A") (102) 
(Price linkage equation "a" ) ( 103) 
The 
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(Trade "A") AT = AQ ( 104 ) 
(Trade 11 a11 ) aT = a0 (105) 
(Supply of transfer services for trade 11 A11 ) 
AM= AM(AT, aT); (106) 
AM 
A a AM = ~;>AM =-~ 0 A a AT a aaT 
(Supp ly of transfer services for trade 11 a11 ) 
aM = aM (AT ' aT); (107) 
aM aaM aM aaM 0 = - ~ = - ~ a aaT A a AT 
(Equilibrium) AQ + aQ = BQ (108) 
symbols are 
AQ, aQ =quantity supplied by sellers 11 A11 and 11 a11 , respecti vely 
BQ = quantity demanded by buyer 11811 
AT, aT = amount of commodity traded in trades 11 A11 and 11 a11 , 
respectively 
AP, aP, BP =price received by sellers 11 A11 and 11 a11 , and paid by 
buyer 11 B11 , respectively 
AM, aM =transfer costs for trades 11 A11 and 11 a11 , respectively 
The goal is to make some inferences with respect to the derived 
elasticity of corrmodity demand that one sel ler faces when there is at 
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least one more seller in t he market. The analysis is done here using the 
derived demand for production of seller "A" (AO) . The value for this 
elasticity can be obtained by making use of a version of Yntema ' s f ormula 
(1932): 
(109) 
where AQO = BQ - aQ =derived demand for production of seller 11 A11 • 
Yntema ' s formula is widely used. One of its most popular applications 
has been to estimate the price elasticity of export demand for U. S. agri-
cultural products (for a survey on this see Gardiner and Dixit, 1986) . 
Equation (109) is correct as long as the supply of transfer services 
is perfectly elastic . When this is not the case , as shown in previous 
pages, a more careful specification must be used. 
( 110) 
The term between bars of equation (110), namely, expression (111) , 
is central to the discussion and its solution is derived in the next few 
pages. 
( 111) 
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The first step wil l be to obtain a solution for(: ::)
5
. From 
equations (103) and (107): 
Equations ( 104 ) and (108) allow us to arrive at an expression 
Plugging (113) and (114) back into (112) and solv ing for (:::)S 
(1 12) 
(113) 
(114) 
(115) 
On the other hand, an expression for ( :::)O can be attained from (102) 
and (106): 
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(116) 
Solving (116) for (:~:)D 
(117) 
After substitution of (115) and (117) into expression (111), and so l ving 
~AQD _ BQ + BQ aQ aM _ aQ 
o B B a a a 
a AP - -
1
- +- (..,..A_M _+_a_M __ _,A,...-M--a-M-) -a
0
--_ - (__,.A_M_a_M _ _ A.,,....M_a_M _)-=B-Q_a_Q ___ ~A-M......,s=-0-A a a A a A a a A B a A B (118 ) 
In elasticities, expression (118) can be stated asl 
D + T Os (n-1) + sn(l-p) A aa 0 = ----,.--,---.---,----....--[ denominator] (119) 
where [denominator]= mp+ [TAA n(m-1)(1-p) + T m(n- l)p - TA n(m-l )p aa a 
1The derivation of (119) is in Appendi x 2. 
D - -
a ap 
s = Q aa Q 
A p=BQ~l; 
Q 
67 
i=A,a; j=A,a 
Bp 
m =A~ 1; 
p 
Expression (119) is subject to the restrictions TAA ~ TAa (~) ~ O; 
Taa ~ TaA(l~p) ~ 0, which correspond to those stated in equations (106) 
and (107), but in terms of elasticities. 
The meaning of D, Tii' and Tij is the same than in Model 1, 
whiles is the direct elasticity of supply of seller "a" . The proportion 
of total trade that seller "A" supplies is p, and m and n are relative 
prices. 
Some important observations1 regarding the formula (119) are that 
the derived demand becomes more inelastic when 
1. The direct elasticities of supply of transfer services are 
smaller (i.e., TAA and T are bigger). aa 
2. The cross elasticities of supply of tr an sf er services are bigger 
(i.e., TAa and TaA are smaller). 
1The mathematical proof of the following assertions is ;n Appendi x 
3. 
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3. The elasticity of supply of seller 11 a11 is smaller (i.e., sis 
sma 11 er). 
4. The relative margin costs of trade "A" are higher (i .e., mis 
bigger). 
Given the assumptions of the system , it does not necessarily follow 
that the derived demand (AO) becomes more inelastic when the direct 
demand of buyer "B" (0) is more inelastic. A sufficient condition for a 
more inelastic direct demand being translated into a more inelastic 
derived demand is that [Taa m(n-1) > TAa n(m-1)] or equivalently that 
aM >AM. This condition means that a change in trade "a" produces a a a 
bigger absolute change in transfer costs 11 a11 than in transfer costs 11 A11 • 
In a similar way, a smaller share of seller "A" in the total trade 
(p) does not imply that its derived elasticity of demand (AO) is 
bigger. Again, the condition [Taam(n-1) > TAan(m-1)] is sufficient 
to establish unambiguously that a smal ler share is corresponded by a 
more elastic derived demand. 
On the other hand , the effect of a higher relative margin cost of 
trade "a" (n) on the derived demand of seller "A" (AO) is ambiguous . 
In a manner similar to Model 1, expressions (118) and (119) will now 
be used to obtain the relationships between the derived commodity demand 
elasticities under different assumptions about the transfer services 
industries . 
Case 1: Equation (25) is a special case of Model 2. If seller "a" 
does not supply commodity at all, then aQ=O and expressions (118 ) and 
(119) are 
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0AQD 
BQ 
B 
aAp 
= 
AM BQ aQ=O 1 - A B 
(120) 
Ao = 0 
aQ=O m + T AAD(m-1) 
(121) 
If the supply of transfer services is infinitely pri ce-responsive, TAA=O, 
and (121) becomes 
0 
m 
( 122) 
Comparing expressions (120), (121), and (122) pairwi se with (68), (69), 
and (70), it is clear that they are the same except for notation. 
Therefore, whatever was said for Case 1 of Model 1 applies here also. 
Case 2: When the transfer services industry has an infinitely 
elastic supp ly: 
(123) 
(124) 
Under these restrictions, equations (118) and (119) co llapse to 
(125) 
A0 j = o + sn (1-p) -r=O mp (126) 
This simplification of Model 2 is very important for empirica l work 
because it characterizes most N-SPEM and SPEM. Because of this it will 
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be used as the basis for comparison with the solutions obtained when the 
supply of transfer services is less than infinitely elastic . 
Case 3: If there is only one transfer services industry serving 
both trades "A" and "a" and its supply is less than perfectly elastic, 
the situation can be characterized by 
With these constraints, expressions (118) and (119) become 
D + T Ds(n-1) + sn(l-p) aa = --- -----.----mp + TAAD(m -1) 
(127) 
(128) 
(129) 
Although it is ambiguous if AD is smaller or bigger 
AM =AM . aM =aM 
A a' a A 
than Ao l -r=O ' it is readily observable that t he deri ved elasticity of 
demand obtained by using equation (129) is always bigger , ceteris 
paribus, than the unconstrained one. This is because the denominator of 
expression (119) is always bigger than that of equation (129), whil e both 
expressions have the same numerator. 
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Case 4: When the transfer services industries serving trades "A" 
and "a" are different and completely independent of each other, and their 
supplies are less than perfectly elastic, the derivatives of margin costs 
with respect to quantity traded are 
AM > 
A 
AM 
a = 0 and 
aM > 
a 
aM 
A = 0 (130) 
Alternatively, in el as tic ity form: 
'T AA > 'T Aa = O and T > 'T = 0 aa aA (131) 
Therefore, equations ( 118) and ( 119) collapse to 
(132) 
(133) 
Other things equal, Ao _ _
0 
is smaller than the unrestricted Ao. 
T Aa-'T aA-
Thi s comes as a consequence of the fact that the right-hand side 
denominator of equation (119) is always smaller than its counterpart of 
(133), while both expressions bear the same numerator. 
Since Ao A A a a >Ao (as seen in Case 3), it follows by 
MA= Ma; Ma= MA 
transitivity that the derived commodity demand obtained under the 
assumption of one transfer services industry is always more elastic, 
ceteris paribus, than the demand estimated under the hypothesis of two 
transfer services industries completely unrelated to each other . 
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Therefore, for any given LAA and Laa, the values that the 
unrestricted derived demand elasticity can take are bounded below by 
AD _ _
0 
and above by Ao It can also be shown 
LAa-LaA- AM =AM . aM =aM . 
A a, a A 
that the standard estimate of the derived commodity 
is bigger than Ao L =L =O'l 
demand elasticity, 
AD I -r=O' Aa aA that is, 
As a summary of what has been said about Model 2, Table 4 presents 
the main analytical results concerning the relationships among derived 
commodity demand elasticities estimated under different assumptions 
about the transfer services industries. To provide a better 
understanding of the logic behind some of these results, especially 
the counterintuitive ~AD 
AM =AM . 
> Ao T =T =O) and aM =aM Aa aA A a' a A 
CD AM =AM . aM =aM > Ao I T=O) • a graphical representation is < A a, a A 
provided in Figures 16, 17, and 18. To simplify the exposition, all three 
figures are drawn under the assumption that AM= 0. Set (a) depicts 
the direct commodity demand of buyer 11S 11 as we 11 as the direct and 
derived commodity supply schedules of seller 11 a11 • On the other hand, 
set (b) presents the derived demand curve that seller 11 A11 faces, which 
is obtained by subtraction of the derived supply of seller 11 a11 from the 
direct demand of buyer 11S 11 • The direct commodity demand of buyer 11 8 11 
and the direct commodity supply of seller 11 a11 are the same in the 
1For a demonstration of this result see Appendix 4. 
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three pi ctures . The differences in the figures are due to the 
assumptions about the transfer costs of trade "a": Figure 16 is drawn 
for aM a= aM A =O , Fi gu re 17 for aM a > aM A =O, and Fi gu re 18 for aM a= aM A > 0 . 
In other words, the value of the derived commod ity demand elasticity that 
* * seller "A" faces at point (Q , P) is just a particular case of 
0 in Fi gure 16b, of Ao I T =T =O in Figure 17b, and of ~ Aa ~ 
AD in Figure 18b. The particular example chosen is such 
AM =AM . aM =aM 
A a' a A 
that (Ao 
AM =AM . 
A a' 
aM =aM 
a A 
>Ao I T=Q) holds, but this inequality can 
reversed by making either AMA A or both MA 
The graphs confirm that (Ao I T=O > Ao 
and AMa positive enough. 
T =T =O) and also that 
Aa aA 
be 
(
AD >AD ) The explanation of this l ast 
AM =AM . aM =aM TA a=TaA=O • 
A a' a A 
seemingly odd inequality is that, given the transfer services supply 
functions and the direct commodity demand and supply schedules, the only 
way in whi ch seller "A" can se ll a higher amount of commodity to buyer 
"B" is through a lower commodity price . But this simultaneous ly leads to 
a smaller quantity supplied by seller "a", and to a larger total amount 
of commodity bought by buyer "B", that is, as trade "A" increases, trade 
"a" decreases but total trade gets bigger. Therefore, since the transfer 
cost of trade "a" responds positively to total trade( AaaM > O\, aM 
a( T+aT) ) 
p 
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actually becomes smaller when more commodity units are supplied by seller 
11 a11 over the relevant quantity range. Thi s is just the opposite of what 
happens when aM > aM =O and it is the cause a A ' 
the transfer services industries attending the trade flows arriving at 
each buyer are interdependent, the derived commodity demand is roore 
elastic than if these industries are completely unrelated to each other . 
The comparative study of the results obtained by means of Models 1 
and 2 is very illuminating. Figure 19 is drawn to help with the 
analysis: it represents a general trade model composed of 2 sellers 
(
11 A11 and 11 a11 ) that trade si multaneously with 2 buyers ("B 11 and 11 b11 ). 
Model 1 is a simplification of this general system, in wh ich sell er 
11 a11 does not supp ly commodity at al l, and in wh ich trades 11 811 and 11 b11 
stand for trades 11 AB 11 and "Ab", respectively. In a similar fashion, 
Model 2 is obtained by eliminating buyer 11 b11 from the system depicted in 
Figure 19, and by labeling trades 11 AB 11 and 11 aB 11 as trades 11 A11 and "a", 
respectively.1 
Inequalities (97) and (134) were derived from Models 1 and 2: 
Model 1: 
1An alternative interpretation of Model 2 is given in the 
presentation of the numerical examples at the end of this chapter. 
(97) 
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Trade "aB" 
Trade 11 ab 11 
Figure 19. Commodity Flows in a Trade System with Two 
Aggregate Supplies and Two Aggregate Demands 
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Model 2: Ao I > Ao 
T=O T =T =0 Aa aA 
(134) 
This means that when the transfer services industries serving each trade 
flow are completely unrelated to each other, the standard estimates of 
AD ob ta i ned through N-SPEM and SP EM (AD I r=O) are un amb i gu ous l y biased 
upward. 
When the transfer services industries serving the trade flows 11 AB 11 , 
"Ab", 11 aB 11 , and 11 ab 11 are interrelated, the situation is much more complex. 
The results obtained by means of Models 1 and 2 are 
Model 1: 
Model 2: 
T =T =0 Aa aA 
( 135) 
(136) 
In words, the inequality (135) says that if there is interdependence 
between the transfer services industries attending trade flows 11 AB 11 and 
11 Ab 11 the derived commod ity demand is more inelastic than if they are 
completely unrelated. In general, if the actual situation is 
characterized by interdependent transfer services industries serving the 
trade flows originating in each seller, the standard estimate of the 
derived demand elasticity is more positi vely biased than if these transfer 
services industries are completely unrelated: 
( 137) 
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On the other hand, expression (136) means that when the transfer services 
industries attending the trade flows 11 AB 11 and 11 aB 11 are related to each 
other , the derived commodity demand elasticity is bigger than when that 
relationship does not exist. Therefore, if the existing circumstance is 
such that the transfer services industries serving the trade flows 
arriv ing at each buyer are interdependent, the usual derived demand 
elasticity estimate is less positively biased than if these transfer 
services industries are completely unrelated to each other: 
Model 2: (138 ) 
Moreover, the right- hand side inequality in expression (136) states 
that with interrelated transfer services industries attending the 
trade flows reaching at each buyer, the sign of the bias of AD I -r=O is 
unknown a priori . 
Model s 1 and 2 do not allow elucidation of what happens when the 
transfer services industries serving the cross trade flows (i.e ., trades 
11 AB 11 and "ab" and trades "Ab" and 11 aB 11 in Figure 19) are related to each 
other. This analysis is not presented here, but it is easy to show 
graphically that for this situation it cannot be determined if the 
derived commodity demand elasticity is bigger or smaller than AD I -r=o· 
In summary, the standard derived commodity demand elasticity 
(Ao/ T=o) is unambiguously overestimating the "true" Ao , unless the 
transfer services i ndu stries attending each buyer are interrelated, 
and/or the transfer services industries serving the cross trade flows are 
interdependent. 
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In either of these last situations the sign of the bias of 
AD I may be either positive or negative. Therefore, it seems more 
I -i:=O 
likely that AD I T=O is biased upward in roost of the cases, although one 
should not dismiss the possibility of a downward bias without further 
knowledge of the transfer services industries. 
The recognition that transfer services are in less than perfectly 
elastic supply introduces the problem of greater complexity for practical 
modeling. Moreover, if the transfer services supply is allowed to 
respond to different trade flows (in the present models this means 
allowing TAa> 0, TaA> 0, TBb>O, TbB>O), the system may easily become 
intractable for empirical work. 
For this reason, it would be very he l pful to have an analytical tool 
to make educated guesses about the importance of increasing the 
sophistication of the model at hand by explicitly including in it the 
supply schedules of transfer services. Equation (119) is this tool 
despite the simplic i ty of its underlying model. By plugging into it 
values for the direct demand elasticity (0), supply elasticity of the 
competitor seller (s), market share (p), and price ratios (m and n), 
the range of estimates of the derived demand elasticity (AO) under 
dtfferent behavioral assumptions regarding the transfer services 
industries can be obtained. In this way not only the likely sign of the 
bias of the calculated derived demand elasticity may be obtained, but 
also a rough estimate of its magnitude as compared to the situation of 
transfer services in less than perfectly elastic supply. 
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To make the point more explicit, three examples are developed below . 
They are concerned with the estimation of the elasticity of foreign 
demand for U. S. soybeans, U.S . wheat, and Brazilian soybeans. Sel ler "A" 
is identified therefore with the U. S. in the first two examples and with 
Brazil in the third one. Buyer 11 811 is the group of importer countries, 
while seller "a" is the group of exporting countries other than that of 
interest. 
The focus of these exercises is to illustrate the effect of 
different parameters characterizing the supply of transfer services (T) 
on the estimated derived elasticity of demand (AD). Because of this, 
the direct demand and supply commodity elasticities (0 and s) are not 
esti mated . Instead, following Johnson (1977), it is assumed that 
domestic demand elasticities (0) are 0.2 for wheat and 0.4 for soybeans . 
The supply elasticity (s) is assumed to be 0.2 for both wh eat and 
soybeans. 
The market shares (p) and the price ratios (m and n) used for the 
calculations are four-year averages, and they appear in Table 5. 
All of these parameters, together with the behavioral parameters of 
the transfer services i ndustri es attending the trade flows arriving at 
buyer 11 B11 (TAA' TAa' Taa ' TaA) were plugged into equation (119), and 
the results obtained for Ao are reported in Tables 6 through 8. 
The set of T specifically used is arbitrary. However, it is chosen 
so that it includes the whole spectrum of values that the derived 
commodity demand elasticity can allowedly adopt. With respect to the 
nature of the industries supplying transfer services to buyer 11 B11 , two 
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Table 5. Market Shares and Price Ratios Used to Estimate the 
Elast i cities of Foreign Demand for U.S. Soybeans and Wheat , 
and Brazilian Soybeans 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Example Period 
U.S. Soybeans a 1983/84 - 1986/87 
U. S. Wheatd 1982/83 - 1985/86 
Brazilian Soybeans a 1983/84 - 1986/87 
asource: USDA. 
bcIF Rotterdam/FOB Gulf Ports. 
ccIF Rotterdam/FOB Rio Grande, Brazi l . 
dsource: International Wheat Council. 
eCIF Japan/ FOB Gulf. 
fcrF Japan/FOB Austra lia . 
Market Price Rat i OS 
Share ( p) m n 
0. 73 l. 05b 1.11 c 
0. 36 1. 24 e 1. 21f 
0.09 1.11 c 1.05b 
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limiting situations are addressed: one with two industries completely 
unrelated to each other and the other with only one industry. The 
reason for this is that these two cases provide respectively the lower 
and upper limit estimates for Ao, given a pair LAA and Laa· For 
instance, the intersection of TAA=l and Laa=lO of Table 6a shows 
Ao=0.57, while its counterpart of Table 6b presents Ao=0.70. This 
means that, ceteris paribus and under the assumptions of the model, Ao 
may be anywhere between 0.57 and 0.70 depending on the "true" values of 
LAa and LaA· On the other hand, LAA and Laa are selected so that 
they cover the whole range allowed, from an infinitely elastic supply 
of transfer services (TAA=O, Taa=O) up to a completely inelastic supply 
(LAA -+oo, T -+oo) including the unitary elasticity case (TAA=l,T =1). aa aa 
Once more, it should be noted that TAA=Taa=O corresponds to the standard 
estimate of derived commodity elasticity found in SPEM and N-SPEM 
(i.e., Ao I T=O), and because of this it is used as the basis for 
comparison. 
The justification for this kind of use of equation (119) is that 
Model 2 can be thought of as a trade system consisting of many buyers and 
sellers in which all buyers are aggregated into a single buyer 11 B11 , and 
all sellers except the one of interest into a single seller "a". In 
Figure 19 this is equivalent to adding up buyers "B" and 11 b11 into buyer 
"B 11 , to aggregate trades "AB 11 and "Ab 11 into trade "A", and to join trades 
"aB" and "ab" in trade "a". In this situation it is impossible to 
distinguish either trade "AB" from "Ab" or trade 11 aB 11 from "ab", what 
implicitly amounts to 
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(139) 
and 
(140) 
where ijM = transfer cost of trade "ij", for i=A,a; j=B,b, and 
ijT = trade 11 1·J· 11 , for 1'-A a· J'-B b ,, ,. 
Equation (140) is just a special case of a single transfer services 
industry attending the trade flows originating in each seller. Taking 
this observation together with the right-hand side of inequality (135) 
it can be cone l uded that except for Ao I -r=O the values contained in 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 underestimate Ao if the transfer services industries 
Model 1: (135) 
serving the trade flows emanating from each seller are completely 
independent. However, even in this situation of no relationship at all, 
the numbers reported in Tables 6a, 7a, and Ba cannot exceed their 
respective AO I -r=O' as it follows from the left-hand side inequality of 
(135) taken jointly with inequality (134): 
Model 2: (134) 
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In summary, the values reported in Tables 6 through 8 correspond to a 
single transfer services industry attending all trade flows originating 
in each seller . In the opposite case (no relationship at all) the values 
for the der ived commodity demand elasticity of Tables 6, 7, and 8 
would be bigger with the exception of AD IT=O" Nevertheless, none of 
the numbers contained in Tables 6a, 7a, and Ba would exceed the one in 
their respective upper-left cell (i.e., the estimate of AD IT=O). 
Example 1: The values of the elasticities of foreign demand for 
U.S. soybeans are presented in Table 6. The standard estimate (AD IT=O) 
is 0.60, attained under the hypothesis that transfer services are in 
perfectly elastic supply. The main observation is that relaxing this 
assumption produces li ttle change on Ao, unless extremely inelastic 
supply schedules of transfer services are considered. Therefore, it 
seems qu ite unlikely that i ntroducing explicit ly the supply of transfer 
services into the trade model is of any help in increasing the accuracy 
of t he empirical estimate of Ao. 
As an aside, Table 6 (as well as Tables 7 and 8) shows three 
analytical results derived before: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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Table 6. Estimates of Foreign Demand Elasticity for U.S. Soybeans 
a. Two Transfer Services Industries Completely 
Unrelated to Each Other 
( AO T =T =0): Aa aA 
LAA 
0 co 
. 6 . 5 0 
1 0.46 0.15 0 
-raa 10 0.45 0.15 0 
100 0. 43 0.15 0 
co 0.41 0 .15 0 
-rAA 
0 1 10 100 co 
0 0.60 0.58 0.48 0.17 0 
1 0. 61 0.60 0.48 0.17 0 
Taa 10 0.71 0. 70 0.57 0.20 0 
100 1. 75 1. 70 1. 39 0.48 0 
co co co co co 0.44 
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Example 2: Table 7 reports the foreign demand el asticity estimates 
for U.S. wheat . It is readily obs~rv abl e that the diff erence between t he 
base case (Ao I T=O = 0.79) and t he va lues of AD with less than perfectly 
el as t ic supply of transfer services is mo re sizable than in Example 1. 
It appears that there could be some motivation to further inquire about 
the nature of the transfer services industries and their behavioral 
parameters. In other words, depending on the need for precision in the 
demand elasticity estimate, it may be worthwhile to model explicitly the 
transfer services industries . 
Example 3: The foreign demand elasticity estimates for Brazilian 
soybeans are contained in Table 8. When compared to the basis 
eo I -r=O = 5.92), the demand elasticities under less than perfectl y 
elastic supplies of transfer services may exhibit important differences . 
Th is is so even within the range of el astic suppli es (TAA~l, Taa~l ) ; for 
instance, if there are two transfer services indus t ries completely 
unrelated to each other and TAA = Taa = 1, Ao equals 3.58 (compared 
t o Ao I -r=O = 5.92) . It can also be seen that, if there is enough 
evidence suggesting tha t the transfer servi ces indu stries are completely 
unrelated to each other, most efforts should be directed t owards modeling 
expl icitly the one dealing with Brazilian exports. This is because thi s 
one has much more potentia l to affect the estimated Ao . The main 
result of thi s exampl e is t hat, unl ess there are strong indications 
supporting the hypothesis that transfer services are i n very el astic 
supply, it seems unwi se to overlook the possible impact of the behavioral 
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Table 7. Estimates of Foreign Demand Elasticity for U. S. Wheat 
a. Two Transfer Services Industries Completely Unrelated to Each Other 
( AD T =T =0) : Aa aA 
TAA 
o 1 2 5 10 100 00 
0 0.79 0.67 0.58 0.41 0. 27 0.04 0 
1 0.78 0.66 0.57 0.40 0.27 0.04 0 
Taa 
5 0.73 0.62 0.54 0.39 0. 27 0.04 0 
10 0.69 0.59 0.52 0.38 0.26 0.04 0 
100 0.51 0. 46 0.41 0.32 0.23 0.04 0 
00 0.45 0 . 40 o. 37 0.29 0.22 0. 04 0 
b. One Transfer Services Industry 
( 
AD AM =AM • aM = aM \ : 
A a' a A } 
TAA 
0 1 2 5 10 100 00 
0 0. 79 0.72 0. 65 0.52 o. 38 0.07 o 
1 0. 81 o. 73 0.67 0. 53 o. 39 0.07 o 
5 0.89 0.80 0.73 0.58 0.43 0.08 0 
Tac 10 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.64 0. 47 0.08 o 
100 2.68 2. 42 2.20 1. 74 1. 29 o. 23 o 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0.18 
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Table 8. Estimates of Foreign Demand Elasticity for Brazilian Soybeans 
a. Two Transfer Services Industries Compl etely Unrelated to Each Other 
( Ao 'Aa='aA=o ) : 
LAA 
0 0.5 1 2 5 10 100 00 
0 5.92 4.46 3.58 2. 57 1. 39 0. 79 0. 09 0 
1 5.90 4.46 3. 58 2. 57 1. 39 0. 79 0. 09 0 
Laa 10 5. 74 4. 36 3. 52 2.54 1. 38 0. 78 0. 09 0 
100 4. 96 3.90 3. 21 2. 37 1. 33 0. 77 0.09 0 
00 4.00 3. 28 2.78 2.13 1. 25 0.74 0.09 0 
b. One Transfer Services Industry 
( AO AM =AM . aM = aM ) : 
A a' a A 
LAA 
2 
3. 
T 3.17 aa 3. 36 
5.27 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
92 
characteristics of the transfer services supplies on the derived demand 
estimates. 
The corollary of the present section is that the relevance of 
modeling specifically the transfer services in N-SPEM and SPEM in order 
to obtain better estimates of the derived commodity demand elasticities 
relies heavily on 
(a) The nature of the transfer services industries and their 
elasticities of supply 
(b) Direct commodity elasticities of supply and demand 
(c) The values of market shares and relative prices 
Depending on these characteristics, the bias introduced on the estimated 
Ao by omitting an explicit formulation of transfer services supplies 
may be either positive or negative and sizable or not. 1 Therefore, 
without further inspection of the trade system it is not safe to assume a 
priori that it is harmless to ignore completely the transfer services 
industries. 
1As it was pointed out previously, the most likely situation seems 
to be the one in which AD I T=O is upwardly biased. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Most spatial and non-spatial partial equilibrium models (SPEM and 
N-SPEM) assume either explicitly or implicitly that transfer services are 
in perfectly elasti c supply. If this case is used as the basis or 
standard for comparison, the presence of a less than infinitely elast ic 
supply of transfer services alters the empiri ca l results obtained from 
those models. 
It is seen that with a less than infinitely price-responsive supply 
of transfer services there is no longer a unique price transmission 
elasticity. One must define a 11 price transmission elasticity for 
supply," which indicates the relative change in the price ratio 
(Seller Price) und er a commodity 
Buyer Price 
for demand," which expresses the 
demand shock, and a 11 pri ce transmission 
. . Seller Price 
relative change 1n (Buyer Price ) caused 
by a supply shock. The relative change in the price ratio (~ellerPP:ice) 
uyer n ce 
is bigger when there is a supply shock than when there is a demand 
shock , unless transfer services are in perfectly elastic supply: in this 
situation, the relative changes under both shocks are the same. 
When the trade model is composed of a single aggregate cormiodity 
supply facing a single aggregate commodity demand, the derived commodity 
supply and demand are less elastic than the standard, and less so the 
more inelastic the supply of transfer services . If commodity as well as 
transfer services elasticities increase in the long run, it is ambiguous 
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how the length of run affects the size of the difference between the 
standard derived elasticity and the derived elasticity estimated under a 
positively sloped supply schedule of transfer services. This is because 
a bigger commodity elasticity exacerbates that difference, while a bigger 
elasticity of su pply of transfer services works in the opposite 
direction. 
The results for the one-supply/one-demand models cannot be directly 
extrapolated to models that have more than one aggregate commodity supply 
and/or demand. This is so because now there are at least two commodity 
trade flows, and these can be attended by a single transfer services 
industry or by different transfer services industries related or not 
related to each other . 
The conclusions of the one-supply/one-demand models apply also to 
more complex systems if there is a one-to-one relationship between trade 
flows and transfer services industries, and these transfer services 
industries are completely independent from each other. With these 
restrictions the standard derived commodity elasticiti es overestimate the 
"true" derived elasticities. The positive bias of the standard derived 
demand (supply) elasticity becomes bigger if the transfer services 
industries attending the trade flows originating in each seller (arriving 
at each buyer) are interdependent while the industries serving the trade 
flows arriving at each buyer (emanat i ng from each seller) are completely 
unrelated . In the opposite situation the standard derived demand 
(supply) elasticity may be either less-positively or negatively biased. 
In all other cases, that is, a single transfer services industry 
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or different transfer services industries related to each other, it is 
not known if the standard derived commodity demand and supply 
elasticities are over- or underestimating the "true" derived commodity 
elasticities. However, it seems more plausible that the standard 
estimates have an upward bias in most situations. 
Anything else equal, the derived commodity demand (supply) cannot be 
more inelastic than when the transfer services attending the trade flows 
arriving at each buyer (originating in each seller) are completely 
independent . On the other hand, the derived demand (supply) cannot be 
more elastic than when there is a single transfer services industry 
serving the trade flows reaching each buyer (emanating from each seller). 
Three exampl es f r om world agricultural trade are given to illustrate 
the main conclusion of the paper: it cannot be said a priori that the 
characteristics of the supply of transfer services are irrelevant for the 
empirical estimation of derived commodity elasticities. Knowledge of 
other parameters of the system can be of help in assessing the need to 
explicitly model the supply of transfer services. To facilitate this 
task, a simple formula is presented. 
The models used to derive the above results are simple and overlook 
some relevant real-world situations. Among these are the possibility of 
commodity substitution and/or complementarity, and the presence of 
storage . They also neglect the possibility of temporary disequilibrium 
and of substitution of transfer services for commodity. Moreover, the 
models are deterministic and there is no room for uncertainty. All of 
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these shortcomings of the present models offer a fertile field for 
further research. 
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APPENDIX 1 
I 
[l + Tbb d(l - r)]TBB o2 g (1 - g)f 
Ao - Ao = ---.......---......-----.,....--- --- + 
T=Q TB b=TbB=O [denominator] 
[l + TBB 0(1 -g)]Tbb d2 r (1- r) (l-f) 
[denominator] > O (Al . l) 
where: [d enominator]= 1 + T88o( l-g) + Tbbd(l - r) + TBBTbbOd(l-g )( l - r) 
A [l+Tbbd (l-r )]{[TBB( l-f ) -TBbf ]O(l-g)+ (l-f) }TbBOdg ( l - r) 
AD - 0 = ----------~-~--=-----------r+ TBb=TbB=O [denominatorJ[divisorJ 
(Al. 2) 
[l+r880(l-g)]{[Tbbf-TbB(l-f )]d(l-r)+f}TBb0dr( l-g ) 
[denominator][divisor] > O 
where : [ denominator] i s the same as in equation (Al.l ). 
Ao _Ao TBBOdr(l - g)(l -f )[l+TBBO(l - g)] 
TBb=TbB =O BMB =BMb; bMb=bMB= [denominator][l+r88o(l - g)+rbbd(l - r)] + 
(Al .3) 
TbbOdg(l -r) f[l+rbbd (l - r ) J 
[denominator][l+T 88o(l-g )+Tbbd(l - r) > O 
where [denominator ] is the same as in equation (Al .l ) . 
By transitivity, ex pressions (Al. l ), (Al. 2), and (Al. 3) allow us to 
derive the following relationships: 
(Al. 4 ) 
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(Al. 5) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Each of the derivatives intervening in expression (118 ) can be 
stated in elasticity form in the following way: 
(A2.l) 
(A2.2) 
(A2 .3 ) 
(A2. 4) 
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(A2.5) 
(A2 .6 ) 
( A2. 7) 
Substituti ng expressions (A2 .1 ) through (A2 . 7) into equation (118), 
[denominator] (A2.8) 
where [denominator] 
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A 
Setting B~ = p (i.e., pis the share of seller A in the overall trade) , 
and rearranging (A2.8 ) , 
a BP 
0 + Os T Ji+ s( l-p) --
aa ap ap 
Ao = ---~~--------[denominator] 
where [denominator] = 
Fi nally : 
O + Taa Os(n-1 ) + sn (l-p) 
[denominator] 
(A2.9) 
(119 ) 
where [denominator]= mp+ [TAA n(m-1 )(1-p) + Taa m(n- l )p - TAa n(m-l)p -
0 - -
T .. 
lJ 
i=A,a; j=A,a 
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and the restrictions T ~T ( P\? o 
AA Aa 1-p/ 
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APPENDIX 3 
The derived demand is more inelastic the smal ler the direct elasticity 
of supply of transfer services to trade "A" . 
aAD = _ [D+TaaDs(n-1) + sn(l-p)J [sn (m-1 )(1 -p )+TaaDs(n- l )(m-l)+D(m-l)J 
dTAA [denominator J2 
(A3.l) 
where [denominator] = mp + [TAAn(m-1)(1-p)+Taam(n-l)p-TAan(m-l )p -
The derived demand is more inelastic the smaller the direct elasticity of 
supply of tr an sf er services to trade 11 a11 • 
aAD _[denominator][Ds(n-l)J-[D+TaaDs(n-l)+sn(l-p)][sm(n-l)p+TAADs(m-l)(n -1)] 
aTaa [denominatorJ2 
which, upon simplification, yields equation (A3.2) . (A3.2) 
aAD - [TAa0n(m-l)p+TaADm(n-l)(l - p)+TAaTaAD(m-l)(n-l)+mnp(l -p)Js 2(n-l) 
a:r= <O 
aa 2 [denominator] 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3.l). 
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The deri ved demand is more inelastic the bigger t he cross elasticity of 
supply of transfer services "A" wi t h respect to trade "a". 
3A0 _ [O + Taa Os(n-1 ) + sn(l-p)J [np + TaA O(n-1)] s(m-1 ) 
oTAa - [d enominatorJ2 
> 0 (A3 . 3) 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3 . l). 
The derived demand i s more inelastic t he bigger the cross elast i city of 
supp ly of transfer services "a" with respect to trade "A". 
3A0 [0 + Taa Os(n - 1) + sn(l-p )J [m(l-p ) + TAa O(m-l )J s(n - 1) 
oTaA = ~~~~~~~~~-[-d~~-. ~t~-]2~~~~~~~~~- > 0 
enom1na or 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3.l). 
(A3 . 4) 
The derived demand is more inelastic the sma l ler the supply elast i ci ty 
of se 11 er "a" . 
= 
[ Z + (X+Y)s][TaaO(n-1) + n(l-p)J - (X+Y)[O + TaaOs( n-1 ) + sn( l-p )J 
[denominatorJ2 
Z[TaaO( n-1) + n(l-p)] - (X+Y)O 
[denominatorJ 2 
= pm[TaaO( n-l)+n (l-p)]+TAA0n(m-1)(1-p)-XO+TAaTaA02(m-l)(n-1) 
[ denomi natorJ2 
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= ---------------..,.--------~ 
[denominatorJ 2 
[np + TaA O(n-l)J[m(l-p) + TAa O(m-1)] 
= ------------,..-------- > 0 
[denominatorJ2 
(A3 . 5) 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3.l). 
Z = p m + TAA 0 (m-1) 
The derived demand is roore inelastic the higher the margin costs of 
trade 11 A11 with respect to the price paid by buyer 11 811 (i.e., the bigger m). 
[D+T Os(n- l)+sn(l-p)][(TAAT -TAT A)Os(n-l)+TAAD+p] 
aa aa a a < 0 ( A3 . 6) 
[denominator] 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3.l) . 
A more inelastic direct demand does not imply a more inelastic 
derived demand. 
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[U+(W+V)O][l+'r s(n-1 )] - [0+T Os( n-l)+sn (l-p ) ] (W+V ) aa aa 
[denominator] 
U[l+T s(n-1)] - sn(l-p)(W+V) 
aa = ~~~~~~~~-=---~~~ 
[denominatorJ2 
= 
[U-TAA sn(m-1)(1 - p)J[l+Taa s(n-1)] - sn(l-p)W 
[denominator] 
[pm+T sm( n-l)p-TA sn(m-l)p-T Asm(n-1)(1-p)J[l+T s(n-1)]-sn(l-p)W aa a a aa = ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-::-~~~~~~~~~~ 
[denominatorJ2 
= 
m[p+Taas(n-l)-TaAs(n-1)(1-p)J[l+Taas (n-l)J 
[denominatorJ2 
2 
TAasn(m-l)p[l+Taas( n-l)]+TAaTaAs n(m-l) (n-1)(1-p ) 
[denominatorJ2 
[p+T s(n-1)-T As(n-1)(1-p)][m+T sm(n-1)-TA sn(m-1)] = aa a aa a 
[denominatorJ2 
where [denominator] is the same as in equation (A3.l). 
w = - T T s(m-l)(n-1) Aa aA 
( A3. 7) 
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Therefore 
Also , T m(n-l) >TA n(m-1 ) :::;. aa a 
A a D > O ao . 
A smaller share of seller 11 A11 in total trade (p) does not imply that 
its derived demand (AD) is rrore elastic . 
aAD = -sn(G+Fp) - [D+TaaDs(n-l )+sn(l -p )]F 
ap [denominatorJ2 
- snG - [D + T Ds(n-1) + sn]F aa = ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
[denominatorJ2 
TaAs2n(n-l)[m+TAaD(m-1)]-[TAAsn(m-l)+FJ[D+Taa0s(n-l )+snJ 
= ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
[den om in at or J 2 
[denominator] 
[m+T sm(n-l)]T ADs(n-1) aa a 
[denominatorJ2 
T ADs (n-l)[TA sn(m-1)-T sm(n-1)-m] 
= a a aa 
[denominatorJ2 
[rn+T sm(n-1)-TA sn(m-l)J[O+T Os(n-l)+sn] aa a aa 
[denominator] 
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- [D+(T +T A)Ds(n- l)+sn][m+T sm(n-1 )- TA sn(m-1)] aa a aa a = ~~~-=---=::....:_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
[denominatorJ 2 
(A3.8) 
where [denominator] is the same as i n equation (A3.l) 
G = [D+T Ds(n-l)+ns]TAA(m-1)-[m+TA D(m-l)JT As (n-1 ) aa a a 
A 
Therefore, aa~ ~ 0 ~ [m+Taasm(n-1 )-TAasn(m-l )] ~ 0 
and 
A 
T m(n-1) >TA n(m-1) ~ ~ < 0 aa a ap · 
A higher relative margin cost of trade 11 a11 (n) has an ambiguous 
effect on the der ived demand of seller 11 A11 (AD) . 
{mp+nJ-[TaaP-TaA(l-p)Jsm+LAAD (m-l) }[TaaD+ (l-p )Js 
[denominator] 
2 
(TAATaa-TAaTaA)[TaaD+(l-p)JDs (m-l )+{D-TaaDs+[TaaD+(l-p )Jsn }J 
[denominatorJ2 
(TaaDs-D) J 
[denominatorJ2 
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T Os[mp+-rAAO(m-1 )-TA s (m-l)p] 
= aa a + 
[denominator] 
s(l - p) {mp- [TaaP-TaA(l - p)]sm~AaTaAOs(m- l)+TAAO ( m- 1 )}-DJ 
[denominatorJ2 
= 
-T TA os2(m- l)p+s(l - p) {mp-[T P-T A ( l-p ) Jsm~A T AOs (m-1) } aa a aa a a a + 
= 
[denominator ] 
2 TAaOs(m-l)p+TaADsm(l - p)+TAaTaAD s(m-1) 
[denominatorJ 2 
[TAaO(m-l)+m(l -p )]{p+TaAD-[TaaP-TaA(l-p)]s}s 
[denominator] 
where [denominator] is the same as i n equation (A3.l). 
(A3.9) 
J = TAAs(m-1)(1-p)+T smp-TA s(m-l)p-T Asm(l-p)+(TAAT -TAT A)Os(m-1) aa a a aa a a 
A 
Therefore, aa~ ~ 0 ~ {p + TaA D - [TaaP - TaA (1-p ) Js } ~ 0. 
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APPENDIX 4 
From all possible values allowed for TAA' the one that makes 
Ao bigger is T =O In this case, equation (133) becomes 
TAa=TaA=O AA • 
= 
D + Taa Ds(n- 1) + sn(l-p) 
mp[l + T s(n-l)J aa 
(A4.1) 
Sub tract ing expression (A4.l ) from expression (126) 
Therefore, 
T =T =0 Aa aA 
= 0 + sn(l-p) 
mp 
D + TaaOs(n-1) + sn(l-p) 
mp[l + T s(n-l)J aa 
[O+sn(l -p )J[l+-r s(n-l)J-0--r Os( n-1 )-sn(l-p) aa aa = ~~~~~~----,"T""""~~--,-----.l'""T""'OI~~~~~~ 
mp[l + T s(n-1)] aa 
Taas2n( n-1) (1-p) 
= > 0 mp[l + -raas(n-1)] (A4.2) 
